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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE 141310Z NOV 72 VIA CAS CHANNELS (BUNKER)

FROM: AMBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON 0269

TO: THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECTION 1 OF 3

1. NHA SENT ME THIS AFTERNOON A MEMORANDUM ENTITLED SUMMARY
OF THE GVN'S VIEWPOINTS AS EXPRESSED BY PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN
THIEU IN THE MEETING BETWEEN THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND
GENERAL ALEXANDER HAIG ON NOVEMBER 11, 1972. ON PERUSAL IT SEEMS
TO CONTAIN NOTHING GENERAL HAIG HAS NOT ALREADY REPORTED, BUT APPARENTLY

THE GVN WISHES TO SUBMIT IT FOR THE RECORD AND HAS ASKED ME TO FORWARD
IT PROMPTLY.

BEGIN TEXT.

SUMMARY
OF
THE GVN'S VIEWPOINTS AS EXPRESSED BY
PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU
IN THE MEETING BETWEEN THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
AND GENERAL ALEXANDER HAIG
ON NOVEMBER 11, 1972

1) PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU OPENED THE MEETING BY ANSWERING THE MAJOR POINTS RAISED BY PRESIDENT NIXON IN HIS LETTER DATED 8TH NOVEMBER 1972. PRESIDENT THIEU SAID THE WORDS "DISTORTIONS", "ATTACKS" USED BY PRESIDENT NIXON ARE NOT JUSTIFIED. IN HIS VARIOUS SPEECHES PRESIDENT THIEU ATTACKED ONLY THE COMMUNISTS, NOT THE US GOVERNMENT. HE FELT IT WAS HIS DUTY TO RAISE THE POINTS WHICH ARE AGAINST THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF VIET-NAM SUCH AS THE NON-WITHDRAWAL OF NVN TROOPS, ESPECIALLY AFTER HANOI DISCLOSED THE CONTENTS OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT. THIS COULD IN NO WAY BE CONSTRUED AS PUBLIC CONFRONTATION WITH THE US. PRESIDENT THIEU HAD TO EXPLAIN THE GVN BASIC POSITION TO MAINTAIN THE MORALE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND ARMED FORCES AND TO AVOID CONFUSION. THE THREE SPECIAL ENVOYS WENT TO NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES ONLY TO EXPLAIN THE POSITION OF THE GVN. THE GVN HAS REFRAINED FROM SEEING THE PRESS BEFORE THE US ELECTION AND HAD TO ANSWER THE PRESS ONLY WHEN CONFRONTED WITH QUESTIONS TOO DIRECT TO BE ELUDED. THE GVN NEVER SAID THAT IT IS A SELL-OUT BY THE US. THE GVN ONLY SAID THAT ACCEPTING CONDITIONS PUT FORTH BY THE COMMUNISTS WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO A SURRENDER WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE LOSS OF SOUTH VIET-NAM.

ON THE COUNCIL OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION
AND CONCORD

2) THE GVN WOULD ACCEPT THE FORMATION OF THE CNRC BUT WOULD LIKE TO PRECISE THAT THE CNRC IS ONLY AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY EXCLUSIVELY IN CHARGE OF ORGANIZING THE ELECTIONS.

THEREFORE THE TERMS "CO CAU CHINH-QUYEN" SHOULD BE DELETED AND REPLACED BY MORE APPROPRIATE TERMS SUCH AS "CO-QUAN HANH-CHANH DAC-TRACH BAU CU".

THE INSTITUTIONS FOR WHICH THE ELECTIONS ARE TO BE HELD WILL HAVE TO BE AGREED UPON THROUGH CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PARTIES AS SPECIFIED IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT.

3) THE GVN AGREES THAT THE COMPOSITION OF THE CNRC SHOULD BE EQUALLY APPOINTED BY BOTH SIDES. THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION TO KEEP THE QUALIFICATION "OF THREE EQUAL SEGMENTS" WHICH SHOULD BE DELETED.

4) THE GVN AGREES THAT ART. 9 (G) DEFINING THE FUNCTIONS OF THE CNRC SHOULD BE DILUTED AND THE FACT THAT THE CNRC HAS NO GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY MADE CLEARER IN THE TEXT.

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ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS **TOP SECRET SENSITIVE**

EYES ONLY

EXCLUSIVE

5) THE GVN WISHES TO EMPHASIZE THAT THIS IS A QUESTION OF LIFE OR DEATH FOR SOUTH VIET-NAM AND THAT, AS A MATTER OF FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE, NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS SHOULD WITHDRAW COMPLETELY FROM SOUTH VIET-NAM IN THE SAME DELAY AND UNDER THE SAME CONDITIONS AS OTHER FOREIGN TROOPS.

6) THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS ARE FOREIGN TROOPS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. FURTHERMORE THEY ARE THE AGGRESSORS. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR THE ALLIED INTERVENTION IN SOUTH VIET-NAM IS THAT THERE IS AGGRESSION FROM THE NORTH, BY NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS.

IF THE EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT, EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY, GIVES TO THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS THE RIGHT TO STAY IN SOUTH VIET-NAM, IT WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO ACKNOWLEDGING THE COMMUNIST CLAIM THAT THE ALLIED TROOPS ARE THE AGGRESSORS AND THAT SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS ARE MERCENARIES.

7) WHEN PEACE IS RESTORED IN SOUTH VIET-NAM, THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE SHOULD BE ABLE TO EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION WITHOUT FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND WITHOUT FEAR.

IF 300,000 NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS STAY IN THE SOUTH, HOW CAN THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE EXERCISE THEIR RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE BAYONETS IN THEIR BACKS?

THE PRESIDENT RECALLED THE DRASTIC REPRISALS MADE BY THE NVA IN HUE AND BINH-DINH AGAINST THOSE WHO SUPPOSEDLY HAD COOPERATED WITH THE GVN.

WITH THE PRESENCE OF THE NVA IN SVN, NOT EVEN THE NLF MEMBERS COULD FREELY EXERT THEIR POLITICAL CHOICE.

THE DARK SCHEME OF NORTH VIET-NAM TO MAINTAIN THEIR 300,000 TROOPS IN THE SOUTH IS TO CONTINUE TO USE THE NLF AS THEIR TOOL AND TO FORCE IT TO ACCOMPLISH FOR HANOI THE GOALS HANOI HAS PRESCRIBED, BUT NOT TO LET THE NLF TO FREELY AGREE TO AND CARRY OUT AN INTERNAL POLITICAL SOLUTION WITH THE GVN, WHICH, IN TRUE APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION, SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE THEMSELVES.

UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, FREE ELECTIONS OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO TAKE PLACE.

8) THE PRINCIPLE AND MODALITIES OF WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS SHOULD BE CLEARLY SPELLED OUT IN THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT.

IT IS AS MUCH A MATTER OF BASIC PRINCIPLE AS A QUESTION OF PRACTICAL PURPOSES. THE PRESENCE OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS WOULD GIVE TO THE COMMUNISTS MANY MORAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGES WHICH THE COMMUNISTS

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SECTION 2 OF 3

THINK THEY ARE ENTITLED TO AND CAN ENJOY FIRST IN THE POLITICAL CONTEST IN SOUTH VIET-NAM.

9) THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS HAVE ALREADY BROKEN UP INTO SMALL UNITS AND ARE INCORPORATED IN THE NLF TROOPS. THEIR PRESENT STRENGTH IN SOUTH VIET-NAM IS REALISTICALLY ESTIMATED AT MORE THAN 300,000.

THE DE-FACTOR WITHDRAWAL OF SOME NORTH VIETNAMESE DIVISIONS FROM M.R. 1 WOULD BE VERY MISLEADING. PEOPLE MAY MISUNDERSTAND THAT ONLY THOSE NVN DIVISIONS WHO CROSSED THE DMZ AFTER MARCH 29 THIS YEAR ARE COUNTED AS NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS AND THOSE WHO WERE ALREADY IN SOUTH VIET-NAM BEFORE THAT DATE SINCE 1956 ARE CONSIDERED AS NLF TROOPS.

10) THE GVN AGREES WITH THE USG THAT, THE ARVN WITH ONE MILLION MEN IS NUMERICALLY STRONGER THAN THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS CURRENTLY IN SOUTH VIET-NAM.

BUT WE ARE NOW DISCUSSING THE CONDITIONS OF PEACE. AS PEACE IS RESTORED THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION WHATEVER FOR THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS TO STAY IN SOUTH VIET-NAM.

THEY DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO STAY IN SVN TO WATCH OVER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS, BECAUSE THAT IS THE ROLE OF THE ICSC, AND A MATTER FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO DEAL WITH.

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE USED TO SAY THAT AS LONG AS THE US TROOPS REMAIN IN SVN THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF FREE CHOICE. LIKEWISE, THE GVN IS OF THE OPINION THAT AS LONG AS THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS ARE IN SVN, THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF FREE CHOICE FOR THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE, EVEN FOR THE NLF.

11) IF THE PRINCIPLE IS ACCEPTED THAT THE NVA COULD STAY IN SVN AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD, IT WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT LATER TO CHECK THE APPLICATION OF THE CLAUSE ON NON REINFORCEMENTS OF COMMUNIST TROOPS IN SVN, AND TO CHECK THE RETURN TO NVN OF NVA UNITS, BECAUSE THE COMMUNISTS WILL CERTAINLY CLAIM THAT ANY NVA TROOPS IN SVN HAD BEEN HERE BEFORE THE CEASE-FIRE, AND HAVE BEEN ALREADY REDUCED.

ON THE REDUCTION OF NUMBER OF TROOPS
ON A ONE-TO-ONE BASIS

12) THE GVN FINDS THAT THE CLAUSE IN PRESIDENT NIXON'S LETTER DATED NOVEMBER 8 ON THE DEMOBILIZATION ON A ONE-TO-ONE BASIS IS NOT CLEAR AND NEEDS FURTHER CLARIFICATION.

IF WE DO NOT LAY CLEARLY THE BASIC PRINCIPLE THAT ALL NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS SHOULD WITHDRAW TO NVN, THEN IT IS BY NO MEANS CERTAIN THAT THE COMMUNISTS WILL DEMOBILIZE THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS. IT IS CERTAIN THAT THEY WILL KEEP THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN SVN, AND DEMOBILIZE ONLY THE SOUTHERN SO-CALLED VIET-CONG TROOPS AND SEND THEM TO THEIR VILLAGES TO WORK AS SUBVERSIVE POLITICAL CADRES AND GUERILLA CADRES.

IF BY "TROOPS SHOULD BE DEMOBILIZED ON A ONE-TO-ONE BASIS AND THAT THEY SHOULD RETURN TO THEIR HOMES" AS INDICATED IN PRESIDENT NIXON'S LETTER, THE USG MEANS TO SAY "RETURN TO NORTH VIET-NAM", THEN IT SHOULD BE CLEARLY SPELLED OUT IN THE AGREEMENT.

13) ON THIS QUESTION, PRESIDENT THIEU HAD RAISED THE HYPOTHESIS THAT IF THE GVN ACCEPTS THE PRINCIPLE TO DEMOBILIZE PART OF SVN ARMED FORCES STRENGTH - SUCH AS, A SHORT TIME AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE, TO DEMOBILIZE 100,000 FOR EXAMPLE - THEN THE GVN WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER NORTH VIET-NAM WOULD FIRST DEMOBILIZE THE SAME NUMBER OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS AND SEND THEM BACK TO NORTH VIET-NAM UNDER INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION WITHIN THE SAME PERIOD OF TIME.

14) THE GVN WOULD VERY MUCH APPRECIATE IT IF THE USG COULD GIVE A DETAILED MEMORANDUM ON THE DETAILED MODALITIES AND HOW THIS DEMOBILIZATION ON A ONE-TO-ONE BASIS WOULD WORK FOR FURTHER STUDIES BY THE GVN.

ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE
TROOPS AND THE POWS AND POLITICAL PRISONERS

15) THE GVN THINKS THAT THE COMMUNISTS CLAIM OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NON-WITHDRAWAL OF NVN TROOPS AND THE POLITICAL PRISONERS IN SOUTH VIET-NAM IS COMPLETELY UNDEFENDABLE. IF THE COMMUNISTS RELEASE ALL THE AMERICAN POW'S AND THE VIETNAMESE POW'S DETAINED THROUGHOUT INDOCHINA, THE GVN WILL RELEASE ALL THE COMMUNIST POW'S DETAINED IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. IN FACT, THE GVN HAS MADE THAT OFFER MANY TIMES IN THE PAST.

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS HAVE NO JUSTIFICATION TO STAY UNDER THE PRETEXT OF GUARANTEEING THE RELEASE OF PRISONERS.

16) THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS BACK INTO NVN IS AN IMPORTANT MATTER OF PRINCIPLE WHICH NORTH VIET-NAM SHOULD IMPLEMENT. THE FACT THAT HANOI INSISTS ON LINKING THIS QUESTION WITH THE RELEASE OF THE SO-CALLED INNOCENT CIVILIANS CAPTURED DURING THE WAR IS ILLOGICAL. THE GVN IS WILLING TO EXCHANGE THOSE SO-CALLED INNOCENT CIVILIANS CAPTURED DURING THE WAR AGAINST THE RELEASE BY THE COMMUNISTS OF ALL THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE INNOCENT CIVILIANS DETAINED BY THE COMMUNISTS THROUGHOUT INDOCHINA.

NO REINFORCEMENTS OF TROOPS AND NO INTRODUCTION
OF WAR MATERIALS INTO NVN AND SVN AFTER THE
CEASE-FIRE

17) IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENT (CHAPTER III,
ARTICLE 16 TO ARTICLE 20), AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE, THE INTRODUCTION
OF REINFORCEMENTS OF TROOPS AND SUPPLEMENTARY MILITARY
PERSONNEL INTO NVN AS WELL AS SVN IS PROHIBITED.

LIKewise, FOREIGN BASES IN BOTH NVN AND SVN ARE TO
BE DISMANTLED, AND NO NEW FOREIGN MILITARY BASES COULD BE
ESTABLISHED IN BOTH ZONES.

THESE PROHIBITIONS UNDER THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENT
ARE SUBJECT TO THE SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF THE ICC.

THE GVN CONSIDERS THAT THESE PROVISIONS OF THE 1954
GENEVA AGREEMENT SHOULD BE REINSTATED IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT.

THE GVN FEELS THAT IT IS UNFAIR AND ILLOGICAL IF IN THE
NEW AGREEMENT THE ABOVE CLAUSES ARE TO BE APPLIED UNILATERALLY
TO SVN9,)6. 2

HANOI HAS, FOR MANY YEARS, INSISTED THAT PEACE SHOULD
BE REESTABLISHED ON THE BASIS OF THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENT.
THERE IS NO REASON WHY IT COULD REFUSE THE REINSTATEMENT
OF THE ABOVE CLAUSES.

THE GVN ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE REINSTATEMENT
OF THESE CLAUSES FOR THESE TWO MAJOR REASONS:

A) AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, WE FIND THAT THE PROHIBITIONS
IN A PEACE SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE BILATERAL, THE MORE SO THAT

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WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

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FROM: AMBASSADOR BUNKER SAIGON 0269
TO: THE WHITE HOUSE, EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
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WE ARE THE VICTIMS OF AGGRESSION AND NVN IS THE AGGRESSOR.

THE PRINCIPAL ANTAGONISTS IN THIS WAR ARE NVN AND SVN,
THE NLF BEING ONLY AN INSTRUMENT OF NVN.

B) ON PRACTICAL GROUNDS, IF HOSTILITIES BREAK OUT AGAIN,
SVN WILL BE IN A VERY DISADVANTAGEOUS POSITION IF THE ABOVE
CLAUSES ARE TO BE APPLIED TO SVN UNILATERALLY DURING THE
CEASE-FIRE. IN FACT, THIS ABSENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN THE
TWO OPPONENTS MIGHT INVITE FURTHER AGGRESSIONS.

ON SUCH AN IMPORTANT MATTER, WE DO NOT THINK THAT OUR
SIDE COULD RELY MERELY ON "UNDERSTANDINGS", OR PRIVATE
ASSURANCES OF SOME COMMUNIST POWERS, BECAUSE WE HAVE
HAD THE EXPERIENCE OF THE "UNDERSTANDINGS" RELATING TO WHAT
THE COMMUNISTS SHOULD DO FOLLOWING THE CESSATION OF BOMBING
OF NVN IN 1968.

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ON THE DMZ

18) THE GVN FEELS THAT A CLAUSE ON THE RESPECT OF THE DMZ AND THE RESPECT OF EACH OTHER'S TERRITORY BY NORTH VIET-NAM AND SOUTH VIET-NAM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENT SHOULD BE CLEARLY INCLUDED IN CHAPTER V. ✓

ON THE ICSC

19) THE GVN FEELS THAT THE COMPOSITION OF THE ICC AS SPECIFIED IN THE DRAFT IS NOT BALANCED.

ON THE ONE HAND THERE ARE TWO COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, WHICH WILL AUTOMATICALLY TAKE THE SIDE OF NVN ON ALL ISSUES. ON THE OTHER, THERE ARE TWO NON-COMMUNIST COUNTRIES WHICH CANNOT BE ASSUMED TO TALK ALWAYS THE GVN SIDE. INDONESIA FOR INSTANCE, ALTHOUGH ANTI-COMMUNIST AT HOME, PURSUES A NON-ALIGNED POLICY IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS WHICH IS OFTEN SLANTED TOWARD THE COMMUNISTS. FOR INSTANCE, INDONESIA STILL HAS MANY PROBLEMS WITH RUSSIA WHICH COMPEL INDONESIA TO TAKE A PARTIAL ATTITUDE. IN ADDITION, INDONESIA HAS AN EMBASSY IN HANOI, WHILE IT IS WILLING TO EXCHANGE ONLY REPRESENTATIVES OF CHAMBER OF COMMERCE WITH SAIGON.

THEREFORE, IN THE VIEW OF THE GVN, ALL THE 4 MEMBERS OF THE ICC SHOULD BE REAL NEUTRAL COUNTRIES.

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ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

20) THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IS TO BE CONVENED TO GUARANTEE THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE OF VIET-NAM AND IN INDOCHINA. THEREFORE, LOGICALLY, LAOS AND KAMPUCHEA SHOULD BE INCLUDED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONFERENCE.

BESIDES, OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES SHOULD BE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONFERENCE. FOR INSTANCE, THERE IS NO REASON WHY JAPAN SHOULD NOT BE ASKED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE CONFERENCE RATHER THAN FRANCE WHOSE OBLIGATIONS TO VIET-NAM HAVE BEEN TERMINATED LONG TIME AGO, THE MORE SO THAT JAPAN IS EXPECTED TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF VIET-NAM AFTER THE WAR.

IN REJECTING JAPAN, NORTH VIET-NAM CLAIMS THAT THE MEMORIES OF THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION IN NVN ARE STILL FRESH. THESE MEMORIES ARE ALSO STILL FRESH IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. FURTHERMORE, WHY DID NVN NOT RECALL THE MEMORIES OF THE FRENCH OCCUPATION IN BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH VIET-NAM? IF NVN COULD FORGET THE MEMORIES OF THE FRENCH OCCUPATION, WHY COULD IT NOT FORGET THE MEMORIES OF THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION?

THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE FULL SIGNIFICANCE ONLY IF CONVENED AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE IS ALREADY IN FORCE IN ALL FOUR INDOCHINESE STATES.

ON COOPERATION

21) THE GVN WISHES TO REAFFIRM THAT IT WANTS TO COOPERATE AS CLOSELY AS POSSIBLE WITH THE US GOVERNMENT. THERE ARE POINTS IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT WHICH THE GVN CONSIDERS AS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE TO SOUTH VIET-NAM NAMELY THE WITHDRAWAL OF NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS AND THE COMPOSITION AND TASKS OF THE CNRC.

THE GVN REQUESTS THE USG TO ADOPT THE SAME STAND ON THOSE POINTS.

THE GVN SUGGESTS THAT A JOINT TASK FORCE BE CREATED IN SAIGON AS FROM TODAY, TO HARMONIZE THE STANDS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES AND TO GET THE DRAFT READY BEFORE DR. KISSINGER NEXT MEETS WITH LE DUC THO IN PARIS.

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22) IT IS DIFFICULT FOR FOREIGN LINGUISTIC EXPERTS TO FULLY REALIZE ALL THE NUANCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE VIETNAMESE LANGUAGE AS USED BY THE COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAMESE.

IN THAT ASPECT THE SERVICE OF THE VIETNAMESE DELEGATION IN PARIS IS AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE US DELEGATION TO WORK ON ANY VIETNAMESE TEXT WHICH MAY BE EVENTUALLY PROPOSED BY HANOI.

WE ARE AWARE THAT A FIRM PRESENTATION OF THE VARIOUS POINTS IN THIS MEMO MAY MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH THE COMMUNIST AGGRESSORS WITHIN THE SHORT DELAY WHICH THE USG CONTEMPLATES AT THIS TIME. THE GVN HOWEVER BELIEVES THAT WHAT OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS STRIVE TO OBTAIN IS NOT JUST A PEACE AGREEMENT, BUT PEACE ITSELF, GENUINE AND DURABLE PEACE. THIS SEEMS TO JUSTIFY THE UTMOST CARE WITH WHICH WE APPROACH THIS VITAL PROBLEM.

NOVEMBER 14, 72

END TEXT.

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2. WARM REGARDS.